Derk Pereboom is Susan Linn Sage Professor in the Sage School of Philosophy and Senior Associate Dean of the Arts and Humanities at Cornell University. He is the author of Living Without Free Will (Cambridge, 2001), Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism (2011), and Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (2014).
Télécharger le livre :  Four Views on Free Will

A lively and engaging debate between four representative views on free will, completely revised and updated with new perspectives Four Views on Free Will is a robust and careful debate about free will, how it interacts with determinism and indeterminism, and whether we...
Editeur : Wiley-Blackwell
Parution : 2024-01-17
Collection : Great Debates in Philosophy
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Télécharger le livre :  The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility

The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility is a collection of 33 articles by leading international scholars on the topic of moral responsibility and its main forms, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.The articles in the volume provide a comprehensive survey on...
Editeur : Oxford University Press
Parution : 2022-01-24

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68,48

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Télécharger le livre :  Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions

Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions provides an account of how we might effectively address wrongdoing given challenges to the legitimacy of anger and retribution that arise from ethical considerations and from concerns about free will. The issue is introduced in Chapter...
Editeur : OUP Oxford
Parution : 2021-08-05

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26,56

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Télécharger le livre :  Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions

Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions provides an account of how we might effectively address wrongdoing given challenges to the legitimacy of anger and retribution that arise from ethical considerations and from concerns about free will. The issue is introduced in Chapter...
Editeur : OUP Oxford
Parution : 2021-08-05

Format(s) : ePub
26,56

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Télécharger le livre :  Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life

Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original conception of moral responsibility. He argues that if determinism were true we would not be morally responsible in the key basic-desert sense at issue in the free will debate, but that we would also lack this kind of...
Editeur : OUP Oxford
Parution : 2014-01-31

Format(s) : PDF
22,82

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Télécharger le livre :  Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life

Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original conception of moral responsibility. He argues that if determinism were true we would not be morally responsible in the key basic-desert sense at issue in the free will debate, but that we would also lack this kind of...
Editeur : OUP Oxford
Parution : 2014-01-30

Format(s) : ePub
22,82

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Télécharger le livre :  Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism

In this book, Derk Pereboom explores how physicalism might best be formulated and defended against the best anti-physicalist arguments. Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out and developed. The first exploits the open possibility that...
Editeur : Oxford University Press
Parution : 2011-03-22

Format(s) : PDF
49,03

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Télécharger le livre :  Four Views on Free Will

Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, this text represents the most up-to-date account of the four major positions in the free will debate. Four serious and well-known philosophers explore the opposing viewpoints...
Editeur : Wiley-Blackwell
Parution : 2009-02-04
Collection : Great Debates in Philosophy
Format(s) : PDF
109,67

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