Agency Theory and Executive Pay

The Remuneration Committee's Dilemma

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Éditeur :

Palgrave Pivot


Paru le : 2018-11-19



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Description


This new book examines the relationship between agency theory and executive pay. It argues that while Jensen and Meckling (1976) were right in their analysis of the agency problem in public corporations they were wrong about the proposed solutions. Drawing on ideas from economics, psychology, sociology and the philosophy of science, the author explains how standard agency theory has contributed to the problem of executive pay rather than solved it. The book explores why companies should be regarded as real entities not legal fictions, how executive pay in public corporations can be conceptualised as a collective action problem and how behavioral science can help in the design of optimal incentive arrangements. An insightful and revolutionary read for those researching corporate governance, HRM and organisation theory, this useful book offers potential solutions to some of the problems with executive pay and the standard model of agency. 


  
Pages
133 pages
Collection
n.c
Parution
2018-11-19
Marque
Palgrave Pivot
EAN papier
9783319999685
EAN PDF
9783319999692

Informations sur l'ebook
Nombre pages copiables
1
Nombre pages imprimables
13
Taille du fichier
1649 Ko
Prix
58,01 €
EAN EPUB
9783319999692

Informations sur l'ebook
Nombre pages copiables
1
Nombre pages imprimables
13
Taille du fichier
1464 Ko
Prix
58,01 €

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