Credible Threats in Negotiations. A Game-theoretic Approach

de

, ,

Éditeur :

Kluwer Academic Publishers


Paru le : 2002

eBook Téléchargement DRM Adobe 🛈
151,80

Téléchargement immédiat
Dès validation de votre commande
Image Louise Reader présentation

Louise Reader

Lisez ce titre sur l'application Louise Reader.

Description

The modern theory of threats in bargaining situations is presented in a unified and systematic treatment that puts the existing literature in a new perspective. Harold Houba and Wilko Bolt provide a masterful synthesis of the fundamental results obtained in the rapidly expanding game-theoretic literature. The relative impacts of the fundamental forces on the bargaining outcome are discussed and related to the visions expressed by Nobel-laureate John Nash. Many topics -such as robustness of the results with respect to the diversity of known bargaining procedures, the role of commitment and policy bargaining situations- receive their most extensive treatment to date.
Credible Threats in Negotiations is suitable as a textbook for graduate students in economic theory and other social sciences and a necessity as a resource for scholars interested in bargaining situations.
Pages
n.c
Collection
n.c
Parution
2002
Marque
Kluwer Academic Publishers
EAN papier
0306475391
EAN PDF
0306475391

Informations sur l'ebook
Nombre pages copiables
1
Nombre pages imprimables
10
Taille du fichier
1445 Ko
Prix
151,80 €

Suggestions personnalisées