The German Federal Commissioner

An Institutionally Hybrid Office, its Holders, and their Recruitment de

Éditeur :

Springer VS


Paru le : 2025-07-28

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Description

Scholars have described the delegation of power from politics to administration with the help of the principal-agent theory. This framework examines challenges in the constellation of a superior, i.e. principal, and their subordinate, i.e. agent. Recruitment is a major way in which political power can be delegated to the administration. However, it is unclear how constellations in which the agent is a hybrid between politics and administration are to be assessed. Germany is familiar with the hybrid institution of the German Federal Commissioner (GFC), uniting elements of both politics and administration. GFCs or ‘Bundesbeauftragte’ are formally not part of ministerial hierarchy, nor of the cabinet. Also, their constitutional position is blurred because many of them hold simultaneous posts within in the legislative. For this hybrid institution, the delegation mechanisms are unclear, especially in recruitment. This contradicts the fact that GFCs are of high public interest; in its first official act, the new German Merz government abolished half of all GFCs. The present study attempts to get to the bottom GFC recruitment by applying them to the principal-agent framework.



 
Pages
358 pages
Collection
n.c
Parution
2025-07-28
Marque
Springer VS
EAN papier
9783658488444
EAN PDF
9783658488451

Informations sur l'ebook
Nombre pages copiables
3
Nombre pages imprimables
35
Taille du fichier
7188 Ko
Prix
117,69 €
EAN EPUB
9783658488451

Informations sur l'ebook
Nombre pages copiables
3
Nombre pages imprimables
35
Taille du fichier
8837 Ko
Prix
117,69 €

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