Téléchargez le livre : Righting Epistemology

Righting Epistemology

Hume's Revolution

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Oxford University Press


Paru le : 2017-04-03



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Description
David Hume launched a historic revolution in epistemology when he showed that our theories about the world have no probability relative to what we think of as our evidence for them, hence that the distinction between justified and unjustified theories does not lie in their different probabilities relative to that evidence. However, allies in his revolution appeared only in the 20th century, in the persons of Sir Karl Popper, Nelson Goodman and W. V. Quine. Hume's second great contribution to the field, which remains unrecognized to this day, was to propose what is now known as reflective equilibrium theory as the framework within which justified and unjustified theories are rightly distinguished. The core of this book comprises an account of these developments from Hume to Quine, an extension of reflective equilibrium theory that renders it a general theory of epistemic justification concerning our beliefs about the world, and an argument that all four of these thinkers would have endorsed that extension. In chapters on Sextus, Descartes, Wittgenstein's On Certainty, and other aspects of Hume's epistemology I defend new readings of those philosophers' writings on skepticism and note significant relationships among their views on matters bearing on the Humean revolution. Finally, in chapters on Hilary Putnam's "Brains in a Vat" and Fred Dretske's contextualism - the only promising version of that view - I show that both fail to rule out the possible truth of radical skeptical hypotheses. This is not surprising, since those hypotheses are in fact possible. They are not, however, of any epistemological significance, since the justification of our beliefs about the world is a function of the extent to which bodies of beliefs to which they belong are in reflective equilibrium, and no extant conception of knowledge is of any epistemological interest.
Pages
256 pages
Collection
n.c
Parution
2017-04-03
Marque
Oxford University Press
EAN papier
9780190662776
EAN PDF
9780190662783
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0
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0
Taille du fichier
15073 Ko
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Prix
36,27 €
EAN EPUB
9780190662790
Informations sur l'ebook
Nombre pages copiables
0
Nombre pages imprimables
0
Taille du fichier
379 Ko
Ce livre est accessible aux handicaps Voir les informations sur l'accessibilité
Prix
46,40 €
Professor of Philosophy, University of Houston

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